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INTRODUCTION

The fire moved quickly through the house as Cameron Todd Willingham screamed
for his children from the front porch.1 Inside the blaze were his three children.2 Firefighters
arrived, uncoiled hoses, and aimed water at the raging fire.3 However, all three Willingham
children died that night from smoke inhalation.4
News of the December 23, 1991, tragedy spread throughout Corsicana, Texas.5
Meanwhile, investigators sought to determine what caused the fire.6 The investigators
“toured the perimeter of the house, taking notes and photographs, like archeologists
mapping out a ruin.”7 In the kitchen, they found smoke and heat damage—signs the fire
had not originated there—so they proceeded to other parts of the shambled home.*
As the investigators continued through the home, they noticed charring along the
base of the walls and burn patterns shaped like puddles on the floor.8 The investigator knew
a “combustible liquid doused on the floor will cause a fire to concentrate in these kinds of
pockets, which is why investigators refer to them as ‘pour patterns’ or ‘puddle
configurations.’”9 The investigators further examined glass from one of the broken
windows.10 The glass was “crazed,” which has long been described as an indicator the fire
burned “fast and hot,” meaning an accelerant was used in the fire.11 The investigators
ultimately identified three locations of origin and concluded the fire was intentionally set.12
The investigators had a clear vision of what happened.13
On the night of January 8, 1992, Willingham was arrested and charged for the
murders of his three children.14 In August 1992, Willingham’s trial commenced and

1
David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, THE NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2009),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/07/trial-by-fire [hereinafter Trial by Fire].
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
*
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. Multiple points of origin was generally thought to indicate that a fire was intentionally started, or at
least speaks to the lower probability that the fire was accidental. Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
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included the expert testimony of an arson investigator.15 At the conclusion of the trial, the
jury deliberated for barely an hour before returning with a unanimous guilty verdict.16 As
the fire investigator had put it, “[t]he fire does not lie.”17
Despite a jury’s findings, flawed fire techniques taint investigations, leading to the
misinterpretation of evidence as indicative of arson. Some courts grapple with the issue of
applicable standards in fire investigations and seek to “weed out” questionable science and
techniques.18 However, others continue to ignore the relevant standards and scientific
method by admitting the flawed testimony of fire investigators in arson cases.19
For instance, West Virginia courts have failed to recognize the National Fire
Protection Association’s (“NFPA”) guideline 921—a standard requiring the application of
the scientific method to fire investigation and debunking many flawed techniques—and
employ the Daubert factors to determine whether expert testimony in arson cases is
admissible.20 The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia’s argument—that it will not
follow NFPA 921 until the legislature enacts a law recognizing the guidelines—is nothing
more than smoke and mirrors.21 Although NFPA 921 guidelines are classified as “marginal
changes,” the guidelines are making actual leaps to overcome the hurdles in innocence
claims involving arson.22 To correct these pitfalls, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West
Virginia—not the legislature—should adopt NFPA 921 as the standard of care, even in the
absence of the legislature’s failure to “codify science.” Doing so will provide a foundation
for the progress and reliability of fire science in West Virginia.
Part II of this article examines the evolution of the legal standards pertaining to the
admission of scientific expert testimony from the adoption of the Frye general acceptance
test, to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the federal abrogation of Frye
through Daubert. Part II also considers how the Rules of Evidence concerning scientific
expert testimony changed on the state level in West Virginia and the interplay of such
expert testimony with arson investigations. Part III of this article argues the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia has turned a blind eye to the evolving standards of expert
testimony by concluding that NFPA 921 is a mere guideline unrecognized by the legislature
and a standard that only provides marginal changes and not new evidence for innocence
claims. Finally, Part IV concludes by reiterating the pitfalls of fire science in the courtroom
and the call for reform.

15

Id.
Id.
17
Id.
18
See generally John J. Lentini, The Standard of Care in Fire Investigation, SCI. FIRE ANALYSIS (2007),
http://www.firescientist.com/Documents/The%20Standard%20of%20CareCAFI%202007.pdf.
19
See infra Section II.C.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
See infra Section III.C.
16
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BACKGROUND

Part II of this article explores the relevant rules concerning expert testimony as
they changed over time and discusses the implementation of those rules in West Virginia.
Section II.A establishes a timeline detailing the changes of expert scientific testimony on
both a federal and state specific level. Section II.B explores the field of fire science and
relevant methods, techniques, and tools used in fire investigation. Finally, Section II.C
introduces the case in West Virginia in which the relevant fire science is overlooked.
A. Admitting Expert Evidence
This Section explores the evolving standards and rules—on both the federal and
state level—concerning scientific expert testimony. More specifically, this Section
examines the changes under the rules of evidence as they apply to scientific expert
testimony.
1. The Evolving Standard: Frye, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and Daubert
Scientific expert testimony has a long history in common law courts.23 The
common law has long recognized the “importance of scientific advice in cases where the
disputed facts were such that the courts lacked sufficient knowledge to draw from them an
informed decision.”24 In 1922, James Frye was accused of murder.25 Frye pleaded not
guilty and, in his defense, offered William Marston, one of the inventors of the lie detector,
as an expert witness.26 Marston intended to testify about the results allegedly proving
Frye’s truthfulness.27 The trial court refused to allow the testimony because polygraphs
were inadmissible until “there is an infallible instrument for ascertaining whether a person
is speaking the truth or not.”28
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia affirmed the trial court’s
exclusion of the polygraph.29 The appellate court put forward what is now recognized as
the “general acceptance test.”30 By the 1970s, Frye’s general acceptance test “had become
23

Tal Golan, Revisiting the History of Scientific Expert Testimony, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 879, 881 (2008).
Id.
25
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
26
Id.
27
Golan, supra note 23, at 927; see also Frye, 293 F. at 1013–14. The polygraph test used in Frye’s case
is “described as the systolic blood pressure deception test. It is asserted that blood pressure is influenced by
change in the emotions of the witness, and that the systolic blood pressure rises are brought about by nervous
impulses sent to the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system.” Id. at 1013. The polygraph here,
which essentially relied on a blood pressure cuff, has drastically changed today in its modern use.
28
Golan, supra note 23, at 927 (internal quotations omitted).
29
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
30
Id. at 1014.
24
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‘not only the majority view, [but] the almost universal view’ in the majority of criminal
courts that considered the admissibility of new scientific evidence.”31
Nevertheless, in 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence were codified and included
rules on expert testimony.32 The new rules made no mention of Frye’s general acceptance
test, nor did the rules articulate any special test for ensuring the reliability of scientific
evidence.33 Instead, Rule 702 casted “the widest net possible,” providing “[i]f scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of opinion or
otherwise.”34
Before the current codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the case of
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.35 brought another refinement.36 In Daubert,
the plaintiffs were born with serious birth defects and blamed Merrell Dow’s Bendectin—
a popular anti-nausea drug mothers took during pregnancies.37 The plaintiffs offered
experts who concluded that the drug caused birth defects.38 The plaintiffs argued the
Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye and, under those rules, the jury—not the
judge—determines the persuasiveness of the scientific evidence introduced.39 The
Supreme Court agreed that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded Frye.40 However, the
Court also ruled that judges are the gatekeepers of such testimony and laid out several
factors to be considered in determining whether to admit scientific expert testimony.41 The
factors include “testability,” whether the science is subject to “peer review,” the known
potential “rate of error,” the existence and maintenance of “controlling standards,” and the

Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a wellrecognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made
must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in
which it belongs.
Id.
31

Golan, supra note 23, at 931 (citation omitted).
Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, A SIMPLIFIED GUIDE TO FORENSIC ADMISSIBILITY AND EXPERT
WITNESSES, http://www.forensicsciencesimplified.org/legal/702.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2018) [hereinafter
A Simplified Guide to Rule 702].
33
Golan, supra note 23, at 932.
34
Id.; see also FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975).
35
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
36
Golan, supra note 23, at 933–34.
37
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582.
38
Id. at 583.
39
Id. at 587, 596–97.
40
Id. at 587.
41
Id. at 592–94.
32

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2020

5

West Virginia Law Review Online, Vol. 121, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 1

6

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 121

question of whether the science is “generally accepted” within the relevant scientific
community.42
One question left open by Daubert was whether this standard applied to expert
testimony not scientific in nature. In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,43 the Court extended
the rule in Daubert to apply to all experts.44 While most states adopted either the Federal
Rules of Evidence or Frye, states retained the ability to adopt their own rules of evidence.45
As such, not all states adopted the Daubert standards or its extension to all experts as
prescribed in Kumho.46
The current version of Rule 702, however, provides lower standards than Daubert
and allows for an expert qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education
to testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the
expert has reliably applied the principle and methods to the facts of the
case.47
In addition to Rule 702, Federal Rule 703 addresses the concerns of expert opinion
testimony by permitting it “[i]f experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on
those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject . . . .”48
2. Daubert in West Virginia: Wilt v. Buracker
In 1994, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia took issue with whether
Daubert should be followed in analyzing the admissibility of expert testimony under West

42

Id.
526 U.S. 137 (1999).
44
Id. at 150. For a more comprehensive understanding of this issue, see the so-called “Daubert Trilogy:”
Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert, 509 U.S. 579
(1993).
45
A Simplified Guide to Rule 702, supra note 32.
46
Id.
47
FED. R. EVID. 702.
48
FED. R. EVID. 703.
43
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Virginia Rules of Evidence 702.49 In Wilt v. Buracker,50 Wilt and his wife sought civil
compensation for injuries sustained from a car accident.51 The defendant was killed in the
collision, and the Wilts brought the action against his estate.52
The plaintiffs sought to introduce several experts at trial. One expert was an
economist whose testimony included the calculation of damages for loss of enjoyment of
life.53 Before embarking on the issue concerning the admissibility of the economist’s
testimony, the court concluded the Daubert analysis applies to West Virginia Rule of
Evidence 702.54 Subsequently, the court decided the expert’s testimony was inadmissible
because it lacked relevance to a calculation of damages for the loss of enjoyment of life.55
Nevertheless, West Virginia adopted Daubert through Wilt. However, the Wilt
decision begs the question—much like Daubert—does the application of the rule
established in Wilt also extend to non-scientific experts?
3. Kumho in West Virginia: Watson v. Inco Alloys International, Inc.
Two years after Kumho, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia addressed
the Wilt’s unanswered question. In Watson v. INCO Alloys International, Inc.,56 the
decedent, Mr. Watson, was operating a stand-up lift for his employer.57 While loading
materials onto a tractor trailer, the lift backed off the side of the tractor trailer, fell
approximately five feet, landed on the floor, and crushed Mr. Watson, who died as a
result.58

49

W. VA. R. EVID. 702.
(a) If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise. (b) In addition to the requirements in subsection (a), expert testimony
based on a novel scientific theory, principle, methodology, or procedure is admissible only
if: (1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods; and (3) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.

Id.
50

443 S.E.2d 196 (W. Va. 1993).
Id. at 199.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 200.
54
Id. at 203 (concluding that “Daubert’s analysis of Federal Rule 702 should be followed in analyzing the
admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence”).
55
Id. at 203–04; see also Gentry v. Mangum, 466 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1995) (explaining further the
application of the court’s gatekeeper function as established in Wilt).
56
545 S.E.2d 294 (W. Va. 2001).
57
Id. at 297.
58
Id.
51
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The plaintiff, decedent’s wife, brought an action alleging that the lift was defective,
was not equipped with side doors, and failed to provide appropriate warnings.59 The
plaintiff proffered the expert testimony of a licensed engineer.60 The lower court excluded
the expert’s testimony on the basis that the proposed testimony concerning the “causation
and enhancement” of Mr. Watson’s injuries was outside his expertise.61 The lower court
reasoned that “the issues of design defects . . . and lack of adequate warnings” were
scientific in nature; thus, the expert “must fulfill the standards set forth in [Wilt/Daubert],”
and the expert here did not.62
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia framed the issue as
“whether Mrs. Watson’s expert witness . . . should be permitted to testify regarding alleged
design defects . . . [including] the lack of adequate warnings.”63 After noting that “[u]nless
an engineer’s opinion is derived from the methods and procedures of science, his or her
testimony is generally considered technical in nature, and not scientific,”64 the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia concluded the lower court erred in excluding the
expert’s testimony.65 Thus, West Virginia declined to extend Wilt/Daubert in its
application to non-scientific experts.
B. Arson Investigation and the Scientific Method
This Section explores changing standards of care, flawed techniques, and the use
of the scientific method in fire investigation. More specifically, this Section provides a
basis for understanding NFPA 921 and its evolution as applied to fire investigations and
specific flawed techniques used by fire investigators.
1. Establishing NFPA 921
In 1992, the NFPA released its first edition of NFPA 921, Guide for Fire and
Explosion Investigation.66 NFPA 921 assists fire investigators throughout the United States
in the investigation of fire incidents and “aid[s] in drawing conclusions and rendering

59

Id.
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 238.
64
Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
65
Id. at 299.
66
NAT’L FIRE PROT. ASS’N, NFPA 921: GUIDE FOR FIRE AND EXPLOSION INVESTIGATION (2017) [hereinafter
NFPA
921],
http://www.nfpa.org/Codes-and-Standards/All-Codes-and-Standards/List-of-Codes-andStandards.
60
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opinions” concerning the origins and cause.67 NFPA 921 also provides “recommendations”
for the methodical investigation and analysis of fire incidents.68 To further aid
investigators, NFPA 921 included “specific procedures” concerning the collection and
analysis of evidence.69
When NFPA 921 was first introduced, many fire investigators countered its
scientific methods with a “culture that believed fire investigation was more art than
science.”70 For instance, in Michigan Millers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Janelle R. Benfield,71
the International Association of Arson Investigators (“IAAI”) filed an amicus curiae brief,
claiming the standard in Daubert should not be applied to fire investigation expert
testimony “because fire investigation is ‘less scientific.’”72
The IAAI endorsed NFPA 921 in 2013.73 In so doing, the IAAI stated NFPA 921
“‘is widely recognized as an authoritative guide for the fire investigation profession’ . . . .
NFPA 921 is ‘an important reference manual and sets forth guidance and methodology
regarding the determination of origin and cause of fires.’”74 Still, the IAAI has stopped
short of identifying NFPA 921 as a “standard of care” and instead is an “offering
guidance.”75
2. Pre-NFPA 921 Techniques and the Scientific Method
For years after its introduction, NFPA 921 remained a controversial document and
was challenged by individuals who believed NFPA 921 “took away their tools.”76 NFPA
921 dealt with misconceptions in the fire investigation community.77 Nearly all of the
misconceptions were related to post-fire artifacts, including “crazed glass, melted bed

67
Parisa Deghani-Taft & Paul Bieber, Folklore and Forensics: The Challenges of Arson Investigation and
Innocence Claims, 119 W. Va. L. Rev. 549, 553–54 (2016) [hereinafter Folklore and Forensics].
68
Id. at 554.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
140 F.3d 915 (11th Cir. 1998).
72
Forensics and Folklore, supra note 67, at 555.
73
Id. at 556.
74
Id. (citation omitted).
75
Id. In his article, Paul Bieber highlights the problem of continuing to refer to NFPA as simply a guide
that can be followed or ignored at the discretion of the fire investigator, because it begs the question of “what
standards actually exist within the field of fire investigation to control or limit the methodologies, processes,
or techniques used in forming expert conclusions regarding origin or cause of a fire?” Id. at 556–57.
76
Lentini, supra note 18.
77
Id.
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springs, and spalled concrete, as evidence of arson.”78 These misconceptions made it
difficult to identify the origin of the fire.79
Most notably, NFPA 921 was not “the debunking of the mythology of arson
investigation; it was the statement that fire investigation should be conducted according to
the scientific method.”80 The scientific method was resisted for a number of years by
investigation professionals who argued that fire investigation was “less scientific” than
other kinds of forensic investigations.81 Still, NFPA’s call for conducting fire investigations
according to the scientific method is recognized in several cases throughout the United
States.82
On a forensic fire scene, the most important determination is the fire’s area of
origin.83 Once the origin of the fire is identified, fire investigators can then examine a scene
to determine the cause of the fire.84 In determining origin, fire investigators examine and
interpret “shape, depth, texture, location, and overall appearance of the effects and patterns
made by the heat of the fire on walls, ceilings, floors, or furniture.”85 NFPA 921 explains
fire behavior and “lists various common fire patterns and effects created in normal room
fires, including ‘V-patterns,’ depth of char, lines of demarcation, soot and smoke
deposits.86
However, a factor complicating the determination of origin is the effect of
flashover.87 Flashover is a “transient phase in an enclosed room fire where the temperature
rises so high throughout the room that combustible items begin to burn, even at floor level
and in areas away from the fire’s origin.”88 As a fire approaches flashover, a smoke layer
forms along the ceiling and radiates heat downward towards the floor.89 At this point, any
combustibles in the room will ignite almost simultaneously.90
Flashover quickly transitions to “full room involvement.”91 At this stage,
ventilation-generated fire patterns create conflicting burn damage and fire patterns

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id.
See generally Folklore and Forensics, supra note 67, at 558.
Lentini, supra note 19.
Id.
Id.
Folklore and Forensics, supra note 67, at 558.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 559.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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throughout the room, distorting the true area of origin.92 Thus, even experienced
investigators can easily misidentify the origin where indicating patterns may or may not
persist through flashover and full room involvement.93
Another technique used in identifying origin is arc mapping.94 NFPA 921 describes
arc mapping as a “technique in which the investigator uses the identification of arc
locations . . . to aid in determining the area of fire origin.”95 Arc mapping interprets the
“spatial relationship” of artifacts on energized electrical conductors damaged by heat
during the course of a fire.96
Unfortunately, there is no published research measuring the accuracy or error rate
of any of these principles, let alone an investigator’s ability to synthesize these factors in
determining where a fire started.97 NFPA 921 does not describe arc mapping as a
standalone methodology to determine origin, but instead opines that arc mapping “can be
used in combination with other data to more clearly define the area of origin.”98
In the most recent version of NFPA 921, the process of “negative corpus” is
described as “[i]dentifying the ignition source for a fire by believing to have eliminated all
ignition sources found, known, or suspected to have been present in the area of origin, and
for which no supporting evidence exists.”99 The current version of NFPA 921 also states
that this “process is not consistent with the [S]cientific [M]ethod, is inappropriate, and
should not be used because it generates untestable hypotheses, and may result in incorrect
determinations of the ignition source . . . .”100 However, the 1992 version of NFPA 921
omits this entirely.101
Finally, the means by which investigators utilize witness statements and how those
statements influence investigators’ final conclusions remains controversial in the fire
investigation community.102 NFPA 921 recognizes the use of witness information as a
legitimate source of data analyzable in fire investigations but provides conflicting guidance
on how a witness statement should be used by a fire investigator in forming an expert
conclusion on the origin.103

92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

Id.
Id.
Id. at 560.
NFPA 921, supra note 66, at 211.
Folklore and Forensics, supra note 67, at 560.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
NFPA 921, supra note 66, at 221 (2017).
Id.
NFPA 921, supra note 66 (1992).
Folklore and Forensics, supra note 67, at 560.
Id. at 560–61.
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NFPA 921 cautions: “[w]itness statements regarding the location of the origin
create a need for the fire investigator to conduct as thorough an investigation as possible to
collect data that can support or refute the witness statements.”104 NFPA 921 further
explains “[w]itness statements are not supported by the investigator’s interpretation of the
physical evidence, [and] the investigator should evaluate each separately.”105 The question
of how NFPA 921 “squares the imperfect and often unverifiable nature of a witness
statement with its general reliance on empirical data remains unclear.”106
C. West Virginia’s (In)Application of NFPA 921 in Anstey v. Ballard
This Section illustrates the issues of failing to apply NFPA 921 as the standard of
care in West Virginia by providing examples at both the trial and appellate level.
Furthermore, this Section sets the background for further exploration of the need to adopt
NFPA 921 as the standard of care in West Virginia.
1. Anstey on Trial
On February 8, 1994, a fire erupted in Harvey Hill, West Virginia, in the home of
Samuel Anstey and his grandmother, Marie Donollo.107 Mr. Anstey was awakened by
debris and the sound of his screaming grandmother. When Anstey opened his door, he felt
intense heat and was confronted by a hallway filled with smoke.108 Unable to reach his
grandmother, Anstey escaped through a window to find help.109 Anstey drove to three
different neighbors; the closest neighbor called 911.110
When asked why he did not stop at the closest neighbor’s home first, Anstey
responded the “truck had a full tank of gas,” and “he was concerned the fire might cause
the truck to explode given its proximity to the trailer.”111 The Oak Hill Volunteer Fire
Department arrived on scene 12 minutes after receiving the 911 call.112 Anstey informed
first responders his grandmother was still inside.113 Upon entering, firefighters discovered
Anstey’s grandmother unconscious and removed her from the building.114 Ms. Donollo
was transported to the hospital and treated for her injuries, but she died on February 12,
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

NFPA 921, supra note 66, at 207; see also Folklore and Forensics, supra note 67, at 561.
NFPA 921, supra note 66, at 207; see also Folklore and Forensics, supra note 67, at 561.
Folklore and Forensics, supra note 67 at 561.
Anstey v. Ballard, 787 S.E.2d 864, 868 (W. Va. 2016).
Id. at 868–69.
Id. at 869.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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1994.115 On May 11, 1994, the grand jury returned an indictment charging the petitioner
with first-degree murder116 and first-degree arson.117 The State proceeded to trial solely on
the murder charge under the theory of felony-murder.118
At trial, the State called several experts, including Roger York, the Assistant State
Fire Marshal; Steven Cruikshank, the Director of Emergency Services and Fire
Coordinator for Fayette County; and Harold Franck, an expert in electrical and forensic
engineering and fire determination.119 Each expert offered testimony regarding the fire’s
cause and origin based on their respective examinations of the trailer and its contents.120
The State also put on testimony by Lieutenant Robert Begley of the Volunteer Fire
Department’s Investigation Unit.121 Begley worked at a funeral home and was also a
volunteer firefighter.122 He completed a two-week, 80-hour training from the National Fire
Academy on fire investigation techniques in addition to other arson determination
classes.123 During his investigations on February 8, 1994, he observed the “fire damage
was in the living room and kitchen areas of the trailer and, principally, in the kitchen ‘from
the counter top up.’”124 Furthering his suspicion, Begley did not observe any heat or smoke
damage in Anstey’s room because there was a towel and weather-stripping surrounding the
door.125
However, Begley observed “a lot of fire damage directly underneath the toaster”
located on the kitchen counter with two sheets of aluminum foil placed on top.126 Begley
conceded to moving the toaster before photographing it and also tampering with the pulldown mechanism during his investigation.127 He moved the plunger to see if it was down
and then put it back to its “original position.”128

115

Id. “According to the State medical examiner, the cause of death was ‘smoke and soot inhalation
resulting in a brain-dead condition.’” Id.
116
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-1 (West 2018).
117
Id. at § 61-3-1; see also Anstey, 787 S.E.2d at 866.
118
Anstey, 787 S.E.2d at 866; see also Felony Murder, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Murder
that occurs during the commission of a dangerous felony (often limited to rape, kidnapping, robbery, burglary,
and arson).).”
119
Anstey, 787 S.E.2d at 870.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 869–70.
122
Transcript of Trial at 1135, State v. Samuel R. Anstey, Indictment No. 94-F-31 (Sept. 8, 1995).
123
Id.
124
Anstey, 787 S.E.2d at 869–70.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Transcript of Trial at 1106, State v. Samuel R. Anstey, Indictment No. 94-F-31 (Sept. 8, 1995).
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Begley further testified checking the breaker box and noticed breakers three, four,
and five tripped.129 Begley checked to confirm the breakers were tripped by moving them
to the off position.130 He also determined the smoke detectors in the trailer were hardwired
to the breaker and, as a result, were not set off during the fire.131 Despite being trained not
to disrupt the scene, Begley turned the tripped breakers back to the on position and then
back to the off position.132 Begley then waited for Assistant State Fire Marshal Roger York
to arrive.133
York134 investigated the scene and testified the origin of the fire was the toaster.
York called Cruikshank to the scene to observe some “suspicious” or “questionable”
things.135 He questioned the fire department’s activities before his arrival and discovered
two points of origin, indicating that the fire was intentionally caused.136 At this point, the
State’s experts also alleged Anstey had disarmed the smoke detectors by flipping its
electrical breaker.137
During the State’s closing, the prosecutor highlighted details relating to the large
estate Anstey was to inherit upon his grandmother’s death and his alleged abusive
behavior.138 On September 8, 1995, the jury found the petitioner guilty of first-degree
murder and recommended life without parole.139
2. Anstey on Appeal
On May 12, 2014, Anstey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus requesting a
new trial or, in the alternative, an omnibus habeas corpus hearing.140 Anstey asserted that
the “advancement of fire science and arson investigation since his 1995 conviction

129

Id.
Id. at 1098.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 1099.
133
Id. at 1107.
134
York was an Assistant State Fire Marshal and had worked in that office since 1989. Id. at 1211. He
enforced the state fire laws and investigated the cause and origin of fires. Id. He had been in the fire department
20 years and listed a long resume of cause and origin related classes, seminars, certifications. Id. at 1212. He
testified in arson cases for the state on four or five separate occasions. Id. at 1214. He also obtained his
bachelor’s degree from Glenville State College and was involved in excess of 500 arson investigations. Id.
York was admitted as an expert at trial. Id. at 1215.
135
Id. at 1242.
136
Id. The state’s expert testified that the fire had been intentionally set with two points of origin: a rigged
toaster in the kitchen and a covered heating vent in Ms. Donollo’s bedroom. Id.
137
Id. at 1448–51.
138
Anstey v. Ballard, 787 S.E.2d 864, 867–69 (W. Va. 2016).
139
Id. at 873.
140
Id.
130
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constituted newly discovered evidence and demonstrates that his trial was fundamentally
unfair in violation of his right to due process of law.”141 Anstey also asserted, “prior to
2000, the scientific method which forms the basis of NFPA 921 was not widely accepted
and was disregarded by the State’s witnesses in investigating the trailer fire.”142
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia disagreed with Anstey’s
assertions for three reasons. First, the court took issue with Anstey’s failure to cite any
controlling authority.143 In other words, Anstey failed to establish that NFPA 921 was
generally accepted as authoritative in West Virginia.144 The court went on to state that
[it] cannot find, nor do the parties cite, any statute or regulation where the
State Fire Commission has expressly adopted NFPA 921 as . . . [a]
standard to be followed in fire investigations in this state. In fact, the
statute pertaining to the State Fire Marshal’s fire investigations does not
mention NFPA 921.145
Because of this lack of authority, the court held Anstey “was not denied his right to a fair
trial and due process of law through the admission of the testimony of the State’s
experts.”146 The court further stated, “[e]ven today, the admissibility of the State’s expert
testimony would be assessed under Rule 702147 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence as
evidence based on technical or specialized knowledge—and not under Daubert/Wilt,”148
and, thus, his due process was not violated.149
Second, the court pointed out that Anstey did not cite any authority requiring “the
State’s cause and origin investigation ha[s] to follow the method outlined in . . . NFPA

141
142
143
144
145
146
147

Id. at 873–74.
Id. at 874.
Id. at 875.
Id. at 876.
Id. (citing W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-3-12(f) (West 2018)).
Id. at 881.
W. VA. R. EVID. 702.
(a) If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.
(b) In addition to the requirements in subsection (a), expert testimony based on a novel
scientific theory, principle, methodology, or procedure is admissible only if:
(1) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(3) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Id.
148
149

Anstey, 787 S.E.2d at 881.
Id.
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921.”150 The court further reasoned that “even after the U.S. Department of Justice
described NFPA 921 as having ‘become a benchmark for the training and expertise of
everyone who purports to be an expert in the origin and cause determination of fires,’
NFPA 921 continues to be described in terms of constituting ‘guidelines.’”151 According
to the Court, “NFPA 921 itself provides that its procedures are not compulsory, expressly
stating in § 1.3 that ‘[d]eviations from these procedures, however, are not necessarily
wrong or inferior but need to be justified.’”152
Finally, with regard to Anstey’s claim that NFPA 921 constituted newly
discovered evidence in the context of advancements in fire science, the court quickly stated
“it becomes abundantly clear that periodic amendments to NFPA 921 do not constitute
newly-discovered evidence that would warrant a new trial in the case at bar.”153 Thus, the
court held there was no reversible error in the circuit court’s order denying habeas corpus
relief.154
III.

ANALYSIS

There are three significant issues that surface from the Anstey case. First, West
Virginia has turned a blind eye to the applicable standard in Daubert by permitting a
volunteer fire investigator with questionable credentials to testify about the nature of the
fire and his findings. Additionally, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia added
salt to the wound by explicitly refusing to recognize the application of Daubert/Wilt to
expert fire investigation. Second, the court’s rationale suggesting the legislature or an
administrative agency must codify NFPA 921 is nothing more than smoke and mirrors.
Lastly, the court created an almost impossible hurdle for innocence claims by concluding
that NFPA 921 consists of periodic amendments not constituting newly discovered
evidence for purposes of habeas corpus relief.
Section III.A explores how West Virginia courts have turned a blind eye in
applying Daubert/Wilt to experts testifying about fire investigation at trial. Section III.B
argues the legislature’s failure to codify NFPA 921 does not justify the court’s refusal to
recognize NFPA 921 as the appropriate standard of care. Lastly, Section III.C illustrates
the hurdle created in Anstey and applied to innocence claims where the underlying
conviction is arson.

150
151
152
153
154

Id. at 876.
Id.
Id. at 876–77.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 882.
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A. West Virginia’s Blind Eye
At Anstey’s trial in 1995, Begley was permitted to testify about his investigation
and findings.155 Begley testified about the intensity of the fire in the kitchen and his opinion
about the origin of the fire.156 Begley’s credentials consisted of a two week, 80-hour course
on fire investigation.157 Although Begley was not qualified as an expert and his credentials
were questionable, he gave testimony only an expert is permitted to give under Rule 702
and Daubert.
More alarmingly, Begley tampered with the scene in direct violation of his minimal
training.158 This tampering included switching the breaker positions to off when they
originally appeared in the tripped position.159 Begley’s conduct tainted the scene and led a
legitimate fire investigator to believe the breakers linked to the smoke detectors were
intentionally turned off because the breaker can only be placed in the off position if done
so intentionally.160 He also tampered with the plunger on the toaster and left it in the down
position despite his testimony saying he was unsure if it was all the way down.161 Based on
the placement and condition of the toaster, the legitimate fire investigator concluded the
toaster was the point of origin.162 Thus, the inexperience and conduct of Begley tainted the
scene and rendered the findings of any legitimate fire investigators questionable.
Even though a Daubert challenge should have raised concerns regarding Begley’s
testimony, the Anstey court noted that “[e]ven today, the admissibility of the State’s expert
testimony would be assessed under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence as
evidence based on technical or specialized knowledge—and not under Daubert/Wilt.”163 In
making such a conclusion, the court intentionally rejected Daubert in arson cases and
validated what happened in Anstey’s trial.
As a result of this holding, fire investigators—who would generally be unqualified
as experts under Daubert—can still testify in arson cases so long as they meet the minimum
standard of “specialized knowledge.”164 It would seem the court has “back peddled” by
falling in line with the earlier idea that fire science is more of an “art” than science.165 The
155

See supra Section II.C.1.
See supra Section II.C.1.
157
See supra Section II.C.1.
158
See supra Section II.C.1.
159
See supra Section II.C.1.
160
See supra Section II.C.1.
161
See supra Section II.C.1.
162
See supra Section II.C.1.
163
Anstey v. Ballard, 787 S.E.2d 864, 881 (W. Va. 2016).
164
W. VA. R. EVID. 702.
165
Folklore and Forensics, supra note 67, at 554. When NFPA 921 was first introduced, many fire
investigators sought to counter its scientific methods with a “culture that believed fire investigation was more
art than science.” Id. at 554.
156
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Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has turned a blind eye by validating Begley’s
conduct and testimony. This “blind eye” recognizes a lower standard than Daubert for fire
investigation testimony in arson cases and is seemingly less concerned about the reliability
of such testimony. This is an issue the courts must resolve because only by holding fire
investigators to the standard in Daubert, can the progress and reliability of fire science be
achieved in our criminal justice system.
B. The Legislative Smoke and Mirror
As part of its rationale in concluding that Anstey was not denied due process, the
court stated, “we cannot find, nor do the parties cite, any statute or regulation where the
State Fire Commission has expressly adopted NFPA 921 as either a compulsory or
mandatory standard to be followed in fire investigations in this state.”166 The court further
noted that “the statute pertaining to the State Fire Marshal’s fire investigations does not
mention NFPA 921.”167
The court seems to suggest that codification adopting NFPA 921 is necessary
before being considered an accepted standard for fire investigators. However, this
argument begs the broader question: Should science be codified by the legislature before
being recognized as generally accepted? Specifically, should we leave it to the legislature
to determine the general acceptability of DNA?
While legislatures certainly regulate DNA and other sciences through the
enactment of laws,168 the regulation of science remains vastly different from the question
of general acceptance and recognition of science. The court relies on this “smoke and
mirror” reasoning in its conclusion, but NFPA 921 debunks the pseudo-science that fire
investigators originally operated under and, instead, provides the scientific method as a
means of proper fire investigation.169
The court should make the determination as to whether science is generally
accepted within the relevant scientific community for purposes of admissibility.170 In
utilizing this rationale, the court seems to exercise its gatekeeping function as provided by
Daubert/Wilt while also simultaneously weakening its role by delegating some authority
to the legislature. It is not for the legislature to make a finding though as to what science is
“generally accepted” within the “relevant scientific community.”171 It is the court that must

166

Anstey, 787 S.E.2d at 876.
Id.
168
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2018) (DNA testing); 42 U.S.C. § 289g (2018) (fetal research); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 29-3-12(f) (West 2018) (power and duties of State Fire Marshal in Investigations); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 921.241 (West 2018) (fingerprints).
169
See generally NFPA 921, supra note 66.
170
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 199
(W. Va. 1993) (adopting Daubert in West Virginia).
171
See generally Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–94; Wilt, 433 S.E.2d at 203.
167
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act as a gatekeeper in determining what scientific testimony should be admissible.172 Thus,
the court’s rationale suggesting the need for the codification of NFPA 921 is an
insubstantial justification for refusing NFPA 921 as the appropriate standard of care.
C. The Hurdle in Arson Related Innocence Claims
Finally, the court’s last reason in denying Anstey’s claim relies on the marginal
changes to NFPA 921.173 In Anstey, the court states “periodic amendments to NFPA 921
do not constitute newly-discovered evidence that would warrant a new trial . . . .”174 Here,
the court is unwilling to recognize the significant changes of NFPA 921 since 1992 and,
instead, identifies changes as periodic amendments that do not share a nexus with Anstey’s
case.
While there may be some truth to the assertion that the individual amendments to
NFPA 921 do not share a nexus with Anstey’s case,175 it is still a mischaracterization to
label the changes to NFPA 921 as periodic amendments that “do not constitute newlydiscovered evidence that would warrant a new trial.”176 The major issue with identifying
the amendments of NFPA 921 as periodic in nature is that it creates a significant hurdle for
individuals with innocence claims.
For instance, consider the initial version of NFPA 921 in 1992.177 The document
does not caution investigators about the reliance on crazed glass as an indicator of arson.178
However, the current version of NFPA 921 advises that “[t]he investigator is urged to be
careful not to make conclusions from glass-breaking morphology alone. Both crazing and
long, smooth, undulating cracks have been found in adjacent panes.”179
Consider now a situation where a fire breaks out, and a fire investigator in 1992
relies on crazed glass as the sole indicator of arson, uses the criticized technique of negative
corpus in finding the fire was intentional, and a defendant is convicted on the fire
investigator’s testimony concerning the crazed glass after eliminating all other ignition
sources. Even though such techniques were widely used before and during the earlier

172

See generally Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592–94; Wilt, 433 S.E.2d at 203.
Anstey v. Ballard, 787 S.E.2d 864, 877 (W. Va. 2016).
174
Id.
175
Rather than considering the need for a relationship between the individual amendments made over the
years in NFPA 921, it is important to note that the nexus between NFPA 921 and Anstey’s case is better
understood as being the overall attitude and acceptance of NFPA 921 as the standard of care when compared
to today’s modern acceptance of NFPA 921 and its resistance in 1994.
176
Anstey, 787 S.E.2d at 877.
177
NFPA 921, supra note 66 (1992).
178
Id. (2017).
179
Id at 58.
173
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versions of NFPA 921, under today’s standards, this would certainly be problematic in
proving that the fire was indeed arson.180
Imagine now the defendant in the above hypothetical seeks to challenge his
conviction after Anstey was decided. While it might seem obvious the amendment to NFPA
921 is significant, the court has since laid the foundation for prosecutors to argue NFPA
921 is not a viable means of challenging a conviction in innocence claims. That is, NFPA
921 was available in 1992 when the hypothetical defendant was convicted, and the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has since recognized amendments like the one
alleged by the hypothetical defendant are “periodic” and do not warrant a new trial.
Thus, by labeling amendments to NFPA 921 as “periodic” in nature that do not
constitute newly discovered evidence, innocence claims involving arson face a greater
challenge in establishing sufficient grounds for a new trial. The court could have easily
denied Anstey’s claims due to lacking a nexus with the science in NFPA 921. However,
by characterizing scientific changes as “periodic” in nature, the court stepped further by
placing a hurdle on the viability of NFPA 921 in innocence claims.181
IV.

CONCLUSION

On the day he was set to die, Cameron Todd Willingham’s parents and close
relatives gathered in the visiting room.182 His mother began to cry upon hearing the
governor refused to grant a stay of his execution.183 Willingham responded to his mother’s
tears by telling her “[d]on’t be sad, Momma . . . . In fifty-five minutes, I’m a free man. I’m
going home to see my kids.”184 Just before receiving the lethal injection, Willingham was
given the opportunity to speak his last words:
The only statement I want to make is that I am an innocent man convicted
of a crime I did not commit. I have been persecuted for twelve years for
something I did not do. From God’s dust I came and to dust I will return,
so the Earth shall become my throne.185
It was almost two years after his execution when the Innocence Project
commissioned a group of top fire investigators to conduct an independent review of the
arson evidence in Willingham’s case.186 The group concluded “each and every one” of the
arson indicators used in his conviction was “scientifically proven to be invalid.”187 In
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187

See id.
Anstey, 787 S.E.2d at 877.
Trial by Fire, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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response to this conclusion, the State of Texas established its own government commission
to investigate the allegations of error and misconduct by the trial experts.188 The
government’s team likewise “concluded that investigators in the Willingham case had no
scientific basis for claiming that the fire was arson, ignored evidence that contradicted their
theory, . . . relied on discredited folklore, and failed to eliminate potential accidental or
alternative causes of the fire.”189 However, the damage was done—Cameron Todd
Willingham was executed at 6:20 p.m. on February 17, 2004.190
The tragedy illustrated in Willingham’s story is a reality brought on by the
ignorance of proper fire science and techniques. Flawed fire investigations misconstrue
investigative findings, and subsequently lead to the misinterpretation of evidence as
indicative of the crime of arson. Some courts grappled with the issue of applicable
standards in fire investigation and sought to “weed out” questionable science and
techniques.191 However, West Virginia did the opposite in its decision.192
West Virginia Courts turned a blind eye to the applicable standard by failing to
recognize NFPA 921 and employ the Daubert factors to determine whether expert
testimony in arson cases is admissible.193 The argument made by the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia hinging its expectation in the legislature to enact a law
recognizing NFPA 921 is nothing more than smoke and mirrors.194 Moreover, the hurdle
in innocence claims—involving arson and NFPA 921 as newly discovered evidence—is
so insurmountable that it classifies progress as “marginal changes” despite actual leaps.195
In order to correct these pitfalls, West Virginia courts—not the legislature—should act as
the “gatekeepers” and take corrective measure in arson cases by recognizing NFPA 921 as
the standard of care, even in the absence of the legislature’s failure to “codify science.”
Only then can a foundation be laid for the progress and reliability of fire science in West
Virginia. Until such change, many people, similar to Cameron Todd Willingham and
Samuel Anstey, run a much too real risk in the face of pure accident—becoming the
damned in a flashover state.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
See Lentini, supra note 18.
Anstey v. Ballard, 787 S.E.2d 864 (W. Va. 2016).
See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section III.C.
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